CAMPAIGNING FOR CONGRESS IN THE “9/11” ERA: CONSIDERATIONS OF GENDER AND PARTY IN RESPONSE TO AN EXOGENOUS SHOCK

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ABSTRACT

This article takes advantage of a naturally occurring experiment to examine how congressional campaign advertising responds to dramatic events. Integrating the literatures on issue ownership and gender stereotypes, we ask how campaign rhetoric and substance changed after the attacks on September 11, 2001, paying particular attention to how those responses were mediated by party and gender expectations. Using data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project (WiscAds) of all ad-airings (not merely ads created) in the top 80-100 media markets in 2000 and 2002, we find that campaigns stepped up issues relevant to 9/11 consistent with party and gender-based issue ownership. Republican men gave more attention to the military than any other group and more attention to foreign affairs than Democratic men or women. However, most noteworthy was the dramatic increase in the symbolic use of the flag for all candidates.
In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it became commonplace to remark that the world would never feel the same to Americans, that culture and politics had changed irreparably. More than a year later, following the Republican victory in the 2002 midterm congressional elections, commentator David Brooks (2002) chided the “chattering classes” for missing the fact that “American politics have been reshaped by September 11.” Most analysis gives reason for pause in asserting such sweeping generalizations. Even before the dawn of 2002, respected nonpartisan commentator Charlie Cook (2002) cautioned that while public opinion polls suggested that 9/11 and the “War on Terror” seemed to endow a president and his party with a strength that seemed lacking before then, there were many “plausible scenarios” for how much these events would continue to buttress that strength. By the summer of 2002, polls suggested that voters were more concerned with the usual domestic issues than with matters that seemed more obviously connected with 9/11 and the war (Dewar, 2002).

Examining the impact of 9/11 on American politics allows us to think more broadly about how national crises shape political behavior. Even though it was a large shock to the political system, 9/11—and other major events--do not just “change everything,” but rather do so in ways likely to have differential effects on different groups of people that are systematic and comprehensible. In other words, political actors are likely to respond to crises in ways consistent with what we already know about political behavior. We investigate the impact of 9/11 on the substance and rhetoric of the ensuing electoral campaigns to see how the candidates responded across the board and how candidates responded along the lines of gender and party, which often divide the American public and candidates in their stands on those issues most closely associated with 9/11—foreign affairs and military matters.
The September, 2001 terrorist attacks fell close to the halfway point between two congressional elections. Content analysis of television advertising for congressional races in 2000 and 2002 provides a basis to compare attention to issues related to 9/11 like foreign policy and military matters as well as the classic symbol of American patriotism—the American flag—in addition to some key domestic issues across party and gender lines. We are interested in three key questions. First, even though 9/11 was a major event that changed political rhetoric and public policy (at least in the short term) it is not clear whether candidates also shifted their attention toward issues and symbols related to 9/11 (foreign affairs, military, flags). Do congressional campaign messages change in response to dramatic events? Second, though we have reason to expect that candidates will address issues related to 9/11, it is unclear how attention to 9/11 relates to traditional campaign issues. How much attention, in what form, and does this agenda status comes at the expense of more traditional issues and symbols that were the mainstay of the 2000 congressional elections (healthcare, education, and the elderly)? Finally, existing research suggests that Republicans and men have a perceived advantage in precisely those issues associated with 9/11 and Democrats and women with social welfare issues that may have been displaced by it. How were the responses to 9/11 shaped by party and to a lesser extent gender? The answers to these questions will shed light not only on the lingering effects of 9/11 but the impact of dramatic events on political behavior more generally.

“9/11” as Electoral Context: It’s the Terror, Stupid?²

Despite the upheaval of the events of late 2001 and after, and the nearly universal view at the time that the war’s impact on the electoral context of 2002 were “too big to ignore” (Dewar, 2002), Gary C. Jacobson’s (2003) analysis of the election results led him to conclude
convincingly that, “Contrary to a great deal of the postelection commentary, the results of the 2002 midterm congressional elections were neither surprising nor historically anomalous.” If the test of electoral politics as usual for a midterm congressional election is that its outcome should be a function of “the number of seats the president's party already holds, how well the economy is doing, and how widely the public approves of the president's performance in office,” then in this sense, the outcome of the 2002 midterm congressional elections was politics as usual (Jacobson, 2003).

This is not to say that 9/11 and the “War on Terror” had no impact on the election. To the contrary, Jacobson says they transformed the electoral context profoundly, largely by shaping one of the key elements of the congressional politics-as-usual model: they deflected attention from issues that might have been more to the Democrats’ advantage such as the shape of the economy and scared off potential Democratic candidates. In this sense, 9/11 did not “change everything” in the election because it did not change the basic model, just the values of the terms in the model. Thus, even if conventional electoral models held for predicting the outcome of the congressional election that followed directly from 9/11, we do not know the impact on campaigns. It is well worth exploring the rhetorical, symbolic, and discursive content of the appeals candidates made to the voters in what was widely understood as a dramatically changed context to understand the incentives that shape strategic decision making by electoral candidates.

Although in the United States the airwaves are not cleared or filled with somber music when national tragedy occurs, the mass media – which are the primary channels through which contemporary electoral campaigns occur – do respond. Lynn Spigel (2004) has traced the impact over the weeks that followed 9/11. Mass media leaders were as convinced as anyone else that U.S. culture had been fundamentally changed, and therefore, they immediately analyzed how the
content of the popular media might have to change. Even if entertainment television quickly returned to normal (Spigel, 2004), we would expect more visible impact of 9/11 on political communication, especially in the electoral context. Two elements of midterm elections are worth noting: foreign policy/military issues and patriotic values.

Though congressional campaigns traditionally focus more heavily on domestic issues, Congress took on terrorism during the campaign season. The Patriot Act was signed into law in October, 2001; the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security, was introduced in early summer, 2002 and passed soon after the midterm election; the “War on Terrorism” was taken to Afghanistan in October, 2001; Congress passed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002" a month before the election, and controversy was already swirling in the United States and abroad over the impending war. Given the overwhelming congressional attention to foreign affairs and military matters, not usually key in electoral politics, ought to be raised into higher relief in congressional campaign priorities, especially compared with the thoroughgoing emphasis on domestic issues – particularly education – in the 2000 elections.

In addition to congressional policy, 9/11 also entered public political discourse through expressions of patriotism–often condensed into virtual or actual waving of the flag. After 9/11, members of Congress invoked the symbol of the flag. In an observation reminiscent of the national anthem itself, for example, Joel Hefley (D-Colo) said,

Mr. Speaker, I passed the Pentagon on my way to work just a few minutes before the plane hit. This morning when I drove by the Pentagon, it was a very real and very different scene. The smoke was still pouring out, and the water was pouring in; but in a
glimmer of hope, the American flag continued to wave on the grounds of the Pentagon.

The American spirit will not be disabled.

The joint resolution (CR 224) passed by Congress to recognize the tragic events of the day called for two actions: people “should join together to defend and honor the Nation and its symbols of strength” and for 30 days, “each United States citizen and every community in the Nation is encouraged to display the flag of the United States at homes, places of work and business, public buildings, and places of worship to remember those individuals who have been lost and to show the solidarity, resolve, and strength of the Nation.”

Waving the flag, either literally or metaphorically, is not an incidental, much less meaningless act. The members of Congress who devoted a portion of the one minute they were each allotted to speak on September 11 to the flag did so because the flag is a form of political communication, expressing unity, survival, and defiance, as well as attachment to country.

Waving the flag is also a way of speaking when any more specific acts of communication using words are likely to be too painful, dangerous, or divisive for the moment, or when it is difficult to know what to say that is truly appropriate. James Der Derian, in his often-cited essay on the framing and interpretation of 9/11, argued,

> there is very little about 9-11 that is safe to say. Unless one is firmly situated in a patriotic, ideological, or religious position (which at home and abroad are increasingly one and the same), it is intellectually difficult and even politically dangerous to assess the meaning of a conflict that phase-shifts with every news cycle….”

Using the flag for communication fits Der Derian’s framework.

We expect that during the first post-9/11 congressional election, the campaigns will evidence increased attention to foreign policy and military affairs, and a substantial increase in
flag-waving. However, Perrin and Smolek (2009) find that rallying in support of government varies by gender, race, and education. Would changes at the elite level be reflected in campaigns across the board, or would they be moderated by party and/or gender? More importantly, if party and gender matter, how do they change the shape of congressional campaigns? Do candidates address different issues or the same issues differently? We turn briefly to the literature on “issue ownership” to lay out the possibilities.

**Issue Ownership and Campaigning in the Post-9/11 Election: Party and Gender**

A growing literature focuses on partisan issue ownership and its role in campaign design and effects (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Benoit & Airne, 2005; Damore, 2004; Doherty, 2008; Dulio & Trumbore, 2009; Hayes, 2005; Kaplan, Park, & Ridout, 2006; Petrocik, 1996). Theories of issue ownership are based on the idea that the public has standing perceptions of the parties that judge one or the other as more competent to deal with particular issues. “Competence” is not the same as agreement with the party’s stand. Republicans, for example, have long been widely regarded as more competent on traditional values, defense, and foreign policy issues even by people who don’t agree with Republican stands on these issues, while Democrats are viewed as more competent on social welfare issues (Kaplan et al., 2006; Petrocik, 1996; Sides, 2006). Indeed, analysis of poll data for 2000 and 2002 show that Americans hold Republicans to be better at foreign affairs and the military issues while Democrats were viewed as better able to handle issues of education, healthcare, and elderly (see Table 1 for summary results).³

Issue ownership theories drive hypotheses that candidates are likely to shape their campaigns to emphasize issues that allow them to draw strength from their party’s issue
ownership (But see Jerit, 2008). Research shows that the impact of issue ownership on campaigns is not straightforward, but depends on the party and electoral context. At the presidential level, at least, Republicans tend to stick more closely to “their” issues than Democrats do (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003). Conventional attributions of issue ownership may guide campaigns more in presidential races than for lower-level races (Benoit & Airne, 2005). Yet there may be good strategic reasons for a candidate to “trespass” on the other party’s issues in particular electoral situations (Damore, 2004; Sides, 2006). When the public prioritizes an issue, Sides (2006) shows both parties are likely to address it. However, the parties frame the issue in ways consistent with party philosophy.

Yet not all issues are the same. Some can be categorized as controversial—in which case there are different sides the parties can take. For example, the parties may disagree over the direction of education policy or defense spending. Other issues, such as so-called valence issues on governmental performance or particular values, do not have multiple sides (Doherty, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2006; Stokes, 1963). One would be hard-pressed, for example, to find folks who believe that candidates should strive to make government performance worse (not better). In the same fashion even though there may be genuine differences over issues like foreign affairs there is little doubt that patriotism writ large is a shared value that candidates can and would wish to be associated with after 9/11. Thus, in the analysis presented here we differentiate between issues over which their can be disagreement and the symbolic values that are widely-shared. Candidates can choose to address 9/11 either by speaking directly to issues in which there are potential disagreements and party strengths/weaknesses (foreign affairs and military matters) or they can do so through largely consensual symbols of patriotism (waving the flag). Even though issue attention and symbolic attention are likely to increase after 9/11, the response should be
differentiated by party. Republicans, who hold an issue-advantage in foreign affairs and military matters, should be more likely to talk about the issue as well as symbolic action. But Democrats, who are disadvantaged in military matters and foreign affairs, should make up that gap through symbolic forms of expression.

The concept of issue ownership has been developed with respect to political parties, but it can be applied in other cases in which categories of candidates are perceived to have special differential issue competence. This certainly includes gender. Given that stereotyping – generalizations about categories of people applied to individual members of that category – is the cognitive framework that drives issue ownership, we can interpret findings on gender stereotypes in terms of issue ownership, allowing us to integrate the party and gender literatures together (see also Herrnson, Lay, & Stokes, 2003).

Public perceptions generally endow women and men with different issue competence and different issue stands, certainly in the area of foreign policy and military affairs (Brown, 1994; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser, Rogers, Fling, Silvers-Pickens, & Butemeyer, 1987; Sapiro, 1981-1982). These perceptions are not constants, however. Jennifer Lawless (2004) found that in the post-9/11 era, the public preference for more conventional male characteristics and, indeed, male leadership was heightened. Falk and Kenski (2006) found that people who said that terrorism and related issues were the most important problem facing the country were especially likely to prefer male leadership. McDermott (1998) finds that stereotypes are heightened in low-information campaigns, as we should expect.

As in the case of party-based issue ownership, a judgment of greater competence for one gender or the other does not necessarily mean that group’s stands are regarded as preferable. In the context of gender stereotypes and expectations, for example, the view that women are better
at social welfare issues has not seemed to give them an edge with voters because this competence
is associated with traditional stereotypes of feminine compassion, empathy, and perhaps
weakness. But that, to some degree, is true of Democrats as well (Hayes, 2005). Perceptions of
candidates’ personal traits and their issue competencies and stands are related, but in complex
ways. Sanbonmatsu (2003) found that people who ascribe traditional differences in personality
traits to men and women are less likely to view women as more competent on a range of issues,
including those that might depend on more stereotypically female traits.

What are the implications of gender-based stereotypes and gender-based issue ownership
for campaign strategy? Although some research has found modest gender differences in
campaign content, most generally finds few gender differences in the agendas and issue stands
expressed in candidate campaigns (Dabelko & Herrnson, 1997; Dolan, 2005; Kahn, 1993;
Larson, 2001). Studies of congressional websites in 1998 (Niven & Zilber, 2001a) and campaign
websites in 2000-2002 (Dolan, 2005) found little difference between men and women in their
issue emphasis. It is not plausible that gender would be a primary determinant of congressional
candidates’ campaigns compared with party, over all, and differences stereotypically attributed
to gender probably reflect party differences in issue discussion (Dolan, 2005). Perceptions of
gender differences in campaigns may be attributable to the treatment they receive in news
coverage of campaigns rather than their actions (Witt, Paget, & Matthews, 1994). Women’s
congressional press officers express frustration at apparent sexism in the treatment the media
give them (Niven & Zilber, 2001b). But at the margins, what are the strategic implications of
gender for the framing of campaigns? Although there are many examples of women candidates
who use the content of gender stereotypes to draw campaign strength (Herrnson et al., 2003), it
can also be strategically wise for a candidate to present counter-stereotypical images (Gordon,
To sum up, research on gender has found little to say that is consistent about the “women” act—certainly less than compared with party (Sapiro, Walsh, Strach, & Hennings, 2009).

9/11 was a major shock to the political system, but one we believe can best be interpreted within the context of congressional campaigns and with an eye to predictable patterns of behavior well-documented in the issue-ownership and gender and politics literatures. By looking at campaigns before and after 9/11 we are able to understand how candidates respond to major, dramatic political events.

To summarize, we are interested in three questions. First, do campaigns respond to dramatic, riveting events? Even though congressional candidates have been less enthusiastic to take on foreign affairs (Dulio & Trumbore, 2009), the increased attention in Congress to both foreign policy issues and flag-waving symbols in the run up to the 2002 election leads us to expect campaigns will increase their attention to issues and symbols related to 9/11 as well (foreign affairs, military, flag). Second, how much attention have candidates given 9/11, in what form, and does this agenda status comes at the expense of more traditional concerns that are the mainstay of congressional elections (healthcare, education, elderly, and the economy)? We expect that candidates will address issues and symbols related to 9/11, though it is unclear how much attention exactly there will be. In our analysis, we distinguish between issues on which their can be disagreement (military and foreign affairs) and symbols that represent consensual values (flag-waving) because we expect that candidates are likely to respond differently to each, especially along gender and party lines (discussed below). Given the limited agenda space (and sustained support for the Republican president in 2002), we expect candidates across the board to
decrease their attention to traditional domestic social welfare issues (education, healthcare, and elderly).

Third, we ask how are responses mediated by party and gender? The extensive literature on issue-ownership suggests that candidates will emphasize those issues for which they have traditional strengths, like Republicans’ emphasis on foreign affairs and Democrats’ on education. But the magnitude of 9/11 provides exactly the circumstances that are ripe for “riding the wave” or trespassing on the other party’s issues, though not in the same ways (Sides, 2006). We expect that Republicans will respond to 9/11 by showcasing their traditional strengths through issues (military and foreign affairs) as well as symbols (flag). Democrats, on the other hand, seeking to address the importance of 9/11, but without much strength in foreign affairs or military matters, will limit their response to largely symbolic communication. The literatures on party issue-ownership and gender and politics suggest that citizens rely on cues to determine what areas Democrats and Republicans as well as women and men are most competent. The literature is not clear whether candidates will be more likely to play to their perceived competences or try to counter them based on gender, and thus we believe that both men and women across the board will have more patriotic symbols in their ads, but whether women compensate by addressing issues or by leaving them out we leave open. We probe these questions by analyzing congressional campaign advertising on television in 2000 and 2002, the congressional elections that immediately preceded and followed the terrorist attacks of late 2001.

**Data and Methods**

Though web-based campaigning offers many advantages for candidates (virtually limitless space to portray themselves) and for researchers (candidates across all races, rather than
just competitive ones) television advertising remains the most important medium of campaigning for congressional seats in contested districts. Nevertheless, campaign advertising is fraught with difficulties for scholars seeking to generalize beyond particular campaigns (Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). Many more ads are produced and archived than are actually run on television, so analysis of archived ads can generate conclusions about campaigns from ads no one in the public ever saw, and these ads may be systematically different (Prior, 2001). Further, using the advertisement as the unit of analysis means that ads are treated the same analytically whether they were aired once or many times, despite the fact that advertising gains its impact from multiple exposures. These and other problems are magnified for students of gender politics because of the relatively small number of women running for office, and therefore the difficulty of getting adequate or comparable samples of ads for male and female candidates (Benze & Declercq, 1985).

The Wisconsin Advertising Project (WiscAds), from which we draw our data, makes available an unprecedented set of television political campaign advertising data. This database includes all campaign advertising in 2000 and 2002 drawn from satellite monitoring of the transmissions of the national networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox), 25 national cable networks (such as CNN, ESPN, and TBS), as well as local advertising in the country’s top 75 media markets in 2000 (reaching over 80 percent of the television-watching public) and top 100 (86 percent) in 2002. The data to which we have access include storyboards for every advertisement derived from screen captures at 4-second intervals, the complete transcript of the ad, and information on the market, day and time of airing, length, cost, and a range of other information, yielding unprecedented data for analysis of political campaigns. The subset of the data we use
here consists of all advertising run by congressional candidates’ campaigns in the general
election (in the top 75 and 100 media markets) in 2000 and 2002.

The original data exist at the level of analysis of airings of advertisements in the media
markets covered by WiscAds. To these existing data, we added further content analysis of the
individual ads. We developed our coding variables from previous work in this area, tested the
coding instrument on all variables for a small sample of ads, revised and elaborated decision
rules on the coding instrument based upon interrater agreement and coder interviews and created
a Microsoft Access interface for coding (which minimized coder error) before we began coding.
Two undergraduates coded the 2000 data and met once a week for reliability checks. Afterwards,
the Wisconsin Advertising Project used the same guidelines developed here to code the 2002
data. After coding, we re-organized the data from ad-airing to the candidate level. Any given
candidate is represented by a set of ads and even more importantly the number of times these ads
are aired – the number of “airings.” Our variables are coded as the proportion of the total of a
candidate’s airings (regardless of how many different ads this represents) revealing a particular
attribute, yielding an indicator of the overall emphasis placed on that attribute.

The unit of analysis for these data is “candidate-year.” This means that every candidate
running ads in 2000 is counted individually and distinctly from 2002, even if she is the same
person. By using candidate-year rather than merely candidate as our unit of analysis we are able
to compare candidates’ patriotic appeals in 2000 and 2002 as different entities. Our dataset
includes 441 candidate-years. Of these 441 candidate-years, 132 candidate-years are from
candidates who ran in both 2000 and 2002.

The ads were coded for references to three elements that seemed most likely to be
directly affected by the preoccupation with the terrorist attacks on the “homeland” and the “War
on Terrorism:” foreign affairs, the military, and the flag as well as the presence of references to three conventionally important domestic issues: education, health care, and the elderly (and the economy for comparison in Table 1). “References” might include verbal references or images; in the cases of the military and even more, the flag, the references were substantially visual. The producers of television advertising for congressional races are professional media experts who carefully craft their products down to the smallest visual or aural detail. Neither uniforms nor flags would appear by mere chance. Producers choose different types of rhetorical and visual appeals for different purposes (Benoit, 2003; Johnston & Kaid, 2002; Richardson, 2002).

In addition to the substantive coding of the ads, which make up our dependent variables, we also include measures important to explaining issue selection that are based on candidate and district characteristics. Our candidate measures include the explanatory variables of gender (dichotomous woman variable) and party (dichotomous democrat variable) of the favored candidate.7 We include a measure of the competitiveness of the race (Kaplan et al., 2006) as measured by CQ Weekly and (ranging from -3 to 3). Druckman et al (2009) show that challengers are “risk takers” and may behave differently than incumbents so we also include a dichotomous measure for the candidate’s incumbent status as reported by the Federal Election Commission.8

Our district variables include a measure of district ideology, the percent of the district that voted for a presidential candidate in the previous election, adjusted for re-districting in 2002 (Jacobson, 2003);9 and a dummy variable for whether or not the district is located in the South.10

To measure the change between 2000 and 2002, we employ difference of means test and Ordinary Least Squares regression. Because the dependent variables in the models we use are proportions of candidate advertising that evince a particular characteristic, which can range over
all values from 0 to 1, we use OLS regression both for ease of interpretation and to maximize the information from the dependent variables.

The availability of this data set, covering all television campaign advertising to a large portion of the American population in both 2000 and 2002, provides the opportunity to take advantage of an exogenous shock to campaigns. Roughly midway between the 2000 and 2002 congressional elections the United States suffered the traumatizing attacks of September 11, 2001. Certainly, as the adage goes, a week in politics is a long time, and many things can change between one election and the next. Naturally occurring, quasi-experimental designs contain large amounts of extraneous “treatments” (T. D. Cook & Campbell, 1979). The congressional elections of 2000 were framed by a hotly contested presidential election (how hotly, candidates would not know until after election day), and the 2002 election was the midterm election for a popular president. But the unavoidable fact is that 9/11 and the resulting war created shocks to the system that remained constituted unforgettable parts of the public consciousness a year later during the 2002 electoral season.

**Waving the Flag for Votes in the 2000 and 2002 Elections**

Table 1 confirms that candidates changed their focus somewhat after 9/11. Looking at our selection of issues related to 9/11 as well as those that were important in 2000, it is clear that candidates did respond in 2002 by increasing their emphasis on foreign affairs, military, and the flag. Indeed, all three appear more in 2002 than in 2000. But there is a difference between issues and symbolic responses. In 2002, issues associated with 9/11 like foreign affairs (12 percent) and the military (8 percent) certainly did not outstrip more traditional domestic policy like education (26 percent), health care (17 percent), the elderly (25 percent) or the economy (26 percent)
percent). However, what is notable in Table 1 is both the substantial proportion of ads that included symbolic patriotism, waving the flag, and the dramatic increase in flag waving in 2002 compared to 2000. It is safe to say that candidates responded to 9/11 in their campaign advertising and they devoted less attention to education and health care, two key issues in 2000, but 9/11 issues did not displace domestic issues. Rather, candidates responded largely through symbolic means.

**Table 1 about Here**

We are interested not only in how candidates’ campaigns changed after 9/11, but whether party and gender moderated responses to the crisis. Table 2 offers two dependent variables as examples to show party and gender differences in campaign themes over time: flag waving and military images. Neither party nor gender made any difference in the display of either of these themes in 2000, while both party and gender differentiated display of military imagery but not flag waving in 2002, with men and Republicans displaying more military imagery. The change column is most relevant to our analysis, and here we see evidence that different party/gender groups responded differently over time, depending on the theme. Republican women constitute the only party/gender group among whom we see no significant changes in flag waving over time, while Republican men constitute the only group among whom military imagery increases significantly from one election to the next. In order to reach any clear conclusions about the gender and party effects, especially with respect to change, however, we turn to multivariate analysis.

**Table 2 about Here**

**Party, Gender and Campaign Themes, 2000-2002**
The shift in campaign themes after the shock of September, 2001 focuses our attention on change, and whether we see any group-based differences in response to the changed context from one congressional election to the next.

We begin with the set of two issues and one symbol that seem most likely to shift over this period: foreign affairs, the military, and flag-waving. Table 3 shows OLS analysis of ad campaign mentions of these three themes, looking at the impact of individual variables (party, candidate gender, the competitiveness of the race, incumbent status) and district effects (percent of the district that voted Democratic in the 2000 presidential election, southern state) in both the 2000 (Model a) and 2002 (Model b) races separately, then considers these predictors as well as year, representing the changed context, in the merged analysis of 2000 and 2002 (Model c).

Our aim is not to present a comprehensive model of candidate campaign imagery but rather to take advantage of this exogenous shock to examine the gender and party dynamics of the impact of a shock in an area that is conventionally understood to have clear party and gender properties. With respect to military displays, for example, so many influences might come into play (e.g. ideology, the candidate’s own military experience or that of the opponent, the presence of military bases, military industries, or even lots of retired people of the “greatest generation” in the district), that we could surely overdetermine the explanation of why 3 percent or 8 percent of ad airings highlighted the military. We would also be exaggerating the importance of these images.

Table 3 shows that neither gender nor party offer any power in explaining flag-waving, military presence, or foreign affairs in 2000 (Model a, Table 3), though candidates in southern states were more likely to include military imagery. In 2002 party has a significant effect on foreign affairs emphasis, and a marginally significant impact on military themes, in both cases,
with Republicans placing more emphasis. Taking 2000 and 2002 together, party and gender played little role with one exception: Democrats were less likely to talk about foreign affairs. The impact of Year 2002 shows that all of these displays increased significantly from one campaign to the next, but this was especially true of flag-waving.

**Table 3 about Here**

The difference of means analysis showed that while the 2002 campaigns increased imagery with obvious connections to the intervening terrorist and war efforts, conventional domestic issues, especially health care and education, declined significantly. By way of comparison with the domains of foreign policy, military, and national symbolism, we conduct a parallel analysis for three domestic issues: education, health care, and the elderly. All three of these are widely understood as issues identified especially closely with the Democratic party and with women’s concerns. Did gender and party play a role in distinguishing candidates’ references to these issues, especially in terms of change from 2000 to 2002?

Gender has little impact on campaign emphasis on any of these domestic issues in either 2000 or 2002, women were more likely to include education in their 2000 campaign ads, but this did not hold for 2002. Party emerges as a significant factor in 2000 with regard to health care, and marginally in 2002 with respect to the elderly. In both cases, and in line with issue-ownership theories, Democrats were more likely to discuss (Table 4). Models 1c, 2c, and 3c show that emphasis on domestic issues shifted significantly from 2000 to 2002, with steep declines in emphasis on each of these issues, though Democrats were still more likely to take on healthcare.

**Table 4 about Here**
It is clear that campaign emphasis changed from 2000 to 2002, most notably in a rise in flag-waving, but also, as a decline in education, healthcare, and elderly mentions. We now turn to the question of whether the response to the changed context was different across different party/gender groups. Table 5 summarizes the results for all six dependent variables using the combined 2000 and 2002 data. Model d singles out Democratic men, Democratic women, and Republican women, while Model e adds Democratic men in 2002 and Democratic and Republican women in 2002. The OLS estimates should reveal unique responses within any of those groups of candidates with reference to Republican men.

Consider first the three variables with the most direct linkage to the 9/11 issues—flag waving, military presence, and foreign affairs. Our analysis of these three concerns (Table 3, Models 1c, 2c, 3c) indicated that across 2000 and 2002 party—not gender—had an influence on advertising content, and even here mostly with respect to party displays of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, there are indications that party/gender groups of candidates responded in somewhat different ways across time.

In line with party and gender-based issue ownership, Table 5 illustrates that Republican men responded the most strongly to 9/11 by including foreign affairs and military matter in their campaign advertisements. But candidates across party and gender lines stepped up their use of the flag.

Returning to social welfare issues—education, healthcare, and the elderly—our analysis (Table 4, Models 1c, 2c, 3c) indicated that party and gender played little role in campaign content, with the exception that Democratic ads were more likely to contain health (2000 and 2000 & 2002 combined) and the elderly (2002) while women were more likely to talk about education (2000). These results are in line with expectations about party and gender issue-based
ownership, but they are not consistent for party and gender across years or the three concerns. When we parse out the results by particular groups we see that Democratic men’s and women’s 2000 and 2002 campaign advertisements were more likely to include health care content. But there were no significant interactions by group and year for these domestic issues.

Table 5 about Here

In sum, compared to 2000 campaign advertisements in 2002 emphasized foreign affairs, military, and flag waving and de-emphasized healthcare, education, and the elderly (Tables 3-5). But campaign advertising responded differently, depending on the particular issue and gender/party of the candidate. On the whole, campaigns stepped up issues more relevant to 9/11 in ways consistent with party and gender-based issue ownership. Republican men gave more attention to the military than any other group and more attention to foreign affairs than Democratic men or women. All candidates dramatically increased their symbolic use of the flag. Notably, though party and gender groupings mattered for military and foreign affairs, they did not seem to play a role in either symbolic acts of patriotism or social issues regularly on the campaign agenda.

Conclusion

Exogenous shocks allow scholars to see not merely “how things change” but how gender and party mediate responses to large-scale national events. Though this paper focused on the symbolic use of patriotism after 9/11, certainly other dramatic events offer issues and potential responses worthy of consideration in the gender-based issue ownership framework presented here. For example, one might ask how campaign advertising responded to the economic recession of 2008. Did ads focus on traditional social issues and symbolic attention to the
recession or were there substantive changes in advertising content featuring this important domestic issue?

For all of the benefits of examining external shocks, they are also fraught with well-documented dangers for interpreters. Certainly, in the present case, a lot of things happened between the congressional campaigns of 2000 and 2002 other than the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath, the latter including the war in Afghanistan and the build-up to the war in Iraq. We must also exert caution in any temporal comparison because we cannot take account of how the “time one” observation – in this case 2000 -- functions as a baseline taking the longer historical view into consideration. There is no direct way of knowing whether 2000 was typical or unusual in terms of large focus on health care or small amounts of flag-waving. And for all of the benefits of the television advertising data, they can only tell us what happened in the most competitive races—not how the typical candidate in a non-competitive race responded. But these admonitions argue in favor of caution, not against taking advantage of quasi-experimental design and the advertising data. 9/11 was both riveting and dominating in the politics of the era and the advertising data have the distinct advantage of letting us see what the television viewing audience was likely to see and hear, rather than just how candidates would like to portray themselves.

If there is one remarkable finding in the pattern of themes it is that the intervening events did not move television campaign focus from the standard domestic issues to problems of war and foreign policy. Indeed, the rise in attention to the latter, although statistically significant, was unimpressive under the circumstances. Very few ad airings explicitly incorporated the terrorism events of September 11, 2001; only 1 percent of Democratic ads and 2 percent of Republican ads, 1 percent of men’s ads, and 3 percent of women’s ads did so. What did happen was the
candidates stepped away from the issues, exactly the kind of concerns that are the focus of issue-ownership studies, and instead moved toward symbolic expressions of their patriotism—literally waving the flag. In short, candidates can respond to the politics of the times through symbolic rather than substantive means. And even though there was a decrease in attention to some of the standard social policy issues, they remained more central than foreign policy and the military.

The research literatures on party-based issue ownership and gender stereotyping – the latter reinterpreted here as gender-based issue ownership -- suggest that the public has strong baseline preconceptions about which party and which gender can handle which issues most competently. These expectations drive the question of whether the party and/or gender of candidates lead campaigns to emphasize different themes in their advertisements and, centrally to the purpose of this investigation, whether they might evince differentiated response to the immediate post-9/11 context in their campaigns. There was little direct effect of gender on campaign content as measured here, little effect of party in 2000, and party effects in the expected directions (on military, foreign affairs, healthcare, and elderly) in 2002.

With respect to change across the quasi-experimental period, Republican men stood out by exhibiting the most consistent and strongest shifts in directions that converge with party and gender expectations: increasing presence of issues with obvious linkages to 9/11 and its aftermath. Candidates across the board increased the symbol with obvious linkages to 9/11.

As some observers noted, although the events of 9/11 galvanized the public, they had less impact on electoral politics than might have been expected. Congressional candidates incorporated patriotism into their campaigns symbolically while continuing to address more traditional domestic concerns in their campaigns. But even if the dynamics of elections
remained fairly stable, some aspects of American life were affected, as a reporter for the *The Hill* noted in late November, 2002, after the campaigns were over:

Look for the gift market this holiday shopping season to reflect the strong Republican showing in the midterm election, the growing attention to America's military might, and a nation that still mourns the attacks of Sept. 11 by celebrating its patriotism. American flags will be a big item this season. With the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks still a fresh memory, the gift market is awash in patriotic bumper stickers, car decals, buttons, mouse pads, T-shirts, coffee mugs, key chains, tree ornaments, neckties and baseball caps bearing the Stars and Stripes (Chourey, 2002).
References


Der Derian, J. 9.11: Before, After, and In Between, Social Science Research Council:


Appendix

Variable Descriptions

**Woman:** 1 if woman, 0 else. From WiscAds data.

**Democrat:** 1 if Democrat, 0 else. From WiscAds data.

**Incumbent:** 1 if incumbent, 0 else, from FEC data.

**Competitiveness:** -3 (favored candidate is very disadvantaged in the race) through 0 (neither candidate has significant advantage) to 3 (favored candidates is very advantaged in the race), from *CQ Weekly*.

**Percent Vote Democrat:** Percent of the district that voted for democratic candidate in 2000 election, adjusted for re-districting in 2002 from the *Almanac of American Politics*.

**South:** 1 if district is in the South, 0 else. The 11 southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

**Flag:** Proportion of ads where the U.S. flag appears.

**Foreign Affairs:** Proportion of ads containing references to foreign affairs generally or any specific foreign affairs themes such as defense, China, Bosnia, etc.

**Military:** Proportion of ads containing any military personnel or veterans (represented as such).

**Education:** Proportion of ads containing any general or specific education themes appear in the ad, including financial assistance and quality of education. Coding: 0 if no, 1 if yes.

**Elderly:** Proportion of ads containing any general or specific themes about the elderly appear in the ad, including (among others) social security, medical care for the aged; Medicare benefits; prescription drug program for elderly. Coding: 0: if no, 1 if yes.

**Health Care:** Proportion of ads containing any general or specific health themes appear in the ad, including (among others) quality of medical care; medical research/training of doctors and other health personnel; hospitals; national health insurance Coding: 0 if no, 1 if yes.

**Year 2002:** Coding: 0 if 2000 campaign, 1 if 2002 campaign.
Notes

1 The authors wish to thank Ken Goldstein for the use of data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Gary Jacobson for sharing data on district partisanship, and for helpful comments Erika Franklin Fowler, Hahrie Han, Christine Percheski, Travis Ridout, Kathy Cramer Walsh and the APR reviewers. For excellent research assistance, we thank Na’ama Nagar and Jennifer Gulig.

2 “It’s the Terror, Stupid,” was the title of a David Brooks (2002) commentary on the results of the 2002 midterm election.

3 Issue ownership is calculated by taking all available poll questions (in the Polling America database) and subtracting percent responding Republicans were more competent from Democrats on the following issues: military (no polls available for 2000), foreign affairs, education, health care, elderly (including seniors and Social Security) and the economy.

4 For a more detailed discussion of the strengths of web-based research see (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2009).

5 For more information on the data and technology, see the Wisconsin Advertising Project website at http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising/ and (Goldstein & Freedman, 2002).

6 The data include 77 women, 364 men and 214 Democrats and 227 Republicans.

7 We say “favored candidate” because some ads are attack ads that focus solely on the opponent.

8 See Appendix for a summary list of variables and their sources.

9 Data were provided by Gary Jacobson and are from the Almanac of American Politics (2004).

10 South is defined as the following 11 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
### Table 1
Campaign Themes in Polls and Candidate Advertisements by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Democratic Issue Ownership</th>
<th>Campaign Advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean 2000</td>
<td>Mean 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-33.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>-5*</td>
<td>-26.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>19.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Democratic Issue Ownership**
Source: Polling America database. Poll questions searched from January 1 to November 1. Polling America is a comprehensive collection of polling data from 1986 to present.
Notes: Democratic issue ownership is calculated by taking a summary of polls that ask about party competence on the particular theme and subtracting percent responding Republicans were more competent from the percent responding Democrats were more competent.
* indicates that the result is calculated from two or fewer poll questions.

**Campaign Advertising**
Source: WiscAds Data
Notes: Campaign advertising variables are coded as proportion of candidate ad airings in which the particular characteristic was evidenced, and thus they range from 0 to 1. All difference of means tests are two-tailed t-tests (with assumptions about equal variances). The unit of analysis is candidate-year. The significance of the results do not differ when party and interest group ads are also included with the exception that the education ads are statistically significant at the .01 level rather than .05 as is reported here. The point estimates are slightly different.
Table 2: Mean Comparison of Flag Waving and Military in Candidate Ads, 2000 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flag Waving</th>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-4.00 (p=.000)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=106)</td>
<td>(N=121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-5.04 (p=.000)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=110)</td>
<td>(N=104)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-stat: Reps-Dems)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-1.32 (p=.191)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-6.49 (p=.000)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=183)</td>
<td>(N=181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-stat: Wom-Men)</td>
<td>(-.904)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.31 (p=.760)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=12)</td>
<td>(N=21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Women</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-1.93 (p=.06)</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=21)</td>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-4.47 (p=.000)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=94)</td>
<td>(N=100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-4.70 (p=.000)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=89)</td>
<td>(N=81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WiscAds Data
Notes: All variables are coded as proportion of candidate ad airings in which the particular characteristic was evidenced, and thus they range from 0 to 1. All difference of means tests are two-tailed (with assumptions about equal variances). The unit of analysis is candidate-year. The significance of the results when party and interest group ads are included do not differ with the exception that men’s and women’s military ads in 2002 is statistically significant at the .05 level (rather than .10 as is reported here).
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

34
Table 3: OLS Analysis of the Proportion of Ad Airings with Patriotic, Military, and Foreign Policy Displays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Source: Authors’ analysis of WiscAds Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.03 (-0.99)</td>
<td>.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-.02 (-0.49)</td>
<td>.02 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.04 (0.78)</td>
<td>-.07 (-1.21)</td>
<td>-.02 (-0.35)</td>
<td>.01 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-.06 (-1.11)</td>
<td>.14 (2.08)**</td>
<td>.05 (1.16)</td>
<td>.01 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>.02 (1.43)</td>
<td>-.03 (-2.26)**</td>
<td>-.01 (-0.90)</td>
<td>.01 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem Vote</td>
<td>.001 (0.51)</td>
<td>-.00 (-0.54)</td>
<td>-.00 (-0.10)</td>
<td>.001 (1.80)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.03 (0.68)</td>
<td>.03 (0.55)</td>
<td>.02 (0.68)</td>
<td>.05 (2.59)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.09 (0.80)</td>
<td>.34 (2.46)**</td>
<td>.11 (1.02)</td>
<td>-.09 (-1.78)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>.19 (6.47)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05 (3.40)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.02 .03</td>
<td>.09 .06</td>
<td>.09 .08</td>
<td>.06 .08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>216 225</td>
<td>441 216</td>
<td>225 441</td>
<td>216 225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses.
Model a for 2000 only: \[ Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \epsilon \]
Model b for 2002 only: \[ Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \epsilon \]
Model c for 2000 and 2002: \[ Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \beta_4 \text{year} + \epsilon \]
(clustered by candidate)

*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
### Table 4: OLS Analysis of the Proportion of Ad-Airings Addressing Social Policy Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>Elderly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 1b</td>
<td>Model 1c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.85)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(-.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.97)*</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.88)</td>
<td>(-1.01)</td>
<td>(-1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.79)*</td>
<td>(1.52)*</td>
<td>(2.24)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem Vote</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.70)</td>
<td>(-.64)</td>
<td>(-.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.50)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.22)**</td>
<td>(2.49)**</td>
<td>(3.51)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis of WiscAds Data

Note: OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses.
Model a for 2000 only: $Y = a + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \varepsilon$
Model b for 2002 only: $Y = a + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \varepsilon$
Model c for 2000 and 2002: $Y = a + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{gender} + \beta_3 \text{party} + \beta_4 \text{year} + \varepsilon$ (clustered by candidate)

*** $p<.01$ ** $p<.05$ * $p<.10$
Table 5: Party and Gender in 2000 and 2002 Campaign Advertising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health Care</th>
<th>Elderly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1d</td>
<td>Model 1e</td>
<td>Model 2d</td>
<td>Model 2e</td>
<td>Model 3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.87)</td>
<td>(-.95)</td>
<td>(1.91)*</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(-.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem Vote</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.21)</td>
<td>(-.10)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(-1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.24)</td>
<td>(-.86)</td>
<td>(-.87)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(-2.28)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Women</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.89)</td>
<td>(-.92)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(-1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.52)**</td>
<td>(3.96)**</td>
<td>(3.40)**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(1.72)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Men 02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.291)**</td>
<td>(-.34)**</td>
<td>(-.46)</td>
<td>(-1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Women 02</td>
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<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.11)</td>
<td>(-.212)**</td>
<td>(-.234)**</td>
<td>(-.18)</td>
<td>(-.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep Women 02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.98)</td>
<td>(-.346)**</td>
<td>(-.367)**</td>
<td>(-.107)</td>
<td>(.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.53)</td>
<td>(1.68)*</td>
<td>(1.53)</td>
<td>(1.68)*</td>
<td>(1.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis of WiscAds Data
Note: OLS estimates, t-statistics in parentheses, clustered by candidate
Model d: \( Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{DemocraticMen} + \beta_3 \text{DemocraticWomen} + \beta_4 \text{RepublicanWomen} + \beta_5 \text{Year} + \epsilon \), where Republican men are the comparison category
Model e: \( Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{competitiveness} + \beta_2 \text{DemocraticMen} + \beta_3 \text{DemocraticWomen} + \beta_4 \text{RepublicanWomen} + \beta_5 \text{Year} + \beta_6 \text{DemocraticMen2002} + \beta_7 \text{DemocraticWomen2002} + \beta_8 \text{RepublicanWomen2002} + \epsilon \), where Republican men are the comparison category
*** \( p<.01 \) ** \( p<.05 \) * \( p<.1 \)
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